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Many developing countries operate geographically 
delineated economic areas in the form of export 
processing zones, special industrial zones, or free 
trade zones. This paper provides an overview of the 
application of World Trade Organization disciplines to 
incentive programs typically employed by developing 
countries in connection with such special economic 
zone programs. The analysis finds that the disciplines 
under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures have the most immediate relevance for middle-
income World Trade Organization members that are not 
exempt for certain “grandfathered” programs, but will 
also concern other developing countries in the future, 
as their exemption expires or their per-capita income 
passes a threshold of US$1,000. Incentives related to 
special economic zones can be broadly grouped into three 
This paper—a product of the International Trade Department, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network—is 
part of a larger effort in the department to assess the characteristics and performance of special economic zones in developing 
countries. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be 
contacted at pwalkenhorst@worldbank.org.  
categories: (i) measures that are consistent with the World 
Trade Organization, notably exemptions from duties and 
taxes on goods exported from special economic zones; (ii) 
measures that are prohibited or subject to challenge under 
World Trade Organization law, notably export subsidies 
and import substitution or domestic content subsidies; 
and (iii) and measures where World Trade Orgainzation 
consistency depends on the facts of the particular case. 
The paper provides a set of recommendations on how 
to eliminate questionable incentives. The single most 
important zone policy reform to achieve World Trade 
Organization compliance is to remove all requirements 
to export and permit importation of goods manufactured 
in special economic zones into the national customs 
territory without any restrictions other than the 
application of import duties and taxes. 
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  3Executive Summary 
 
Many developing countries operate geographically delineated economic areas in the form 
of export processing zones, special industrial zones, or free trade zones. They experiment 
in these special economic zones (SEZs) with infrastructure, regulatory, and fiscal policies 
that are different from those implemented in the rest of the domestic economy with the 
aim of attracting foreign investment, creating employment opportunities, and boosting 
exports.  Special incentives for zone-based firms play a prominent role in most 
countries’ programs. 
 
While SEZs are not specifically mentioned by name in any of the multilateral agreements 
concluded under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO), several types of 
incentives that are typically part of SEZ policy are subject to disciplines under the WTO, 
most notably through provisions in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (SCM Agreement). This Paper provides an overview of the application of 
WTO disciplines to incentive programs typically employed by developing countries in 
connection with SEZ programs. It is intended to inform policy makers, zone 
administrators, and the development community about the WTO consistency of 
such incentive measures. Our analysis is concerned exclusively with multilateral law 
and leaves economic aspects concerning beneficial or adverse effects of such fiscal 
incentives aside.  As in all legal analysis, different interpretations of particular provisions 
might be possible and the ultimate decision on the legality of a particular measure 
remains subject to the authoritative interpretation of the WTO and its Members. 
 
SEZ-related incentives can be broadly grouped into three categories: (i) measures that 
seem to be WTO consistent, (ii) measures that seem to be prohibited or subject to 
challenge under WTO law, and (iii) and measures where WTO consistency depends on 
the facts of the particular case.
1  It should be noted that pursuant to Special and 
Differential Treatment (SDT), least developed WTO Members and countries whose per 
capita gross national product is under US$1,000 in 1990 dollars are currently generally 
exempt from the disciplines of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures.
2 Moreover, 16 countries are currently exempt pursuant to phase-out provisions 
for certain “grandfathered” programs through 2015.
3  Hence, the WTO disciplines have 
most immediate relevance for middle-income WTO members that are not exempt 
for certain “grandfathered” programs, but will also concern other developing 
countries in the future, as their exemption expires or their per-capita income passes 
the US$1,000 threshold. 
 
                                                 
1 This terminology echoes the SCM Agreement’s terminology of prohibited, actionable, and non-actionable 
measures. 
2 The non-LDC countries with a per capita GNP below US$1,000 US Dollars are: Bolivia, Cameroon, 
Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Nicaragua, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe. 
3 The exempt countries due to “grandfathered” programs are: Belize, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Grenada, Guatemala, Jamaica, Jordan, Mauritius, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis, 
St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Uruguay.  
  4Concerning measures that appear WTO legal, the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures excludes from the definition of “subsidy” the core fiscal 
benefit provided by SEZs – an exemptions from duties and taxes on goods exported 
from SEZs. Hence, the following SEZ-related measures appear to be WTO legal: 
 
  Exemption of exported products from import duties; 
  Exemption of exported products from indirect taxes; 
  Exemption of goods consumed in the production process from import duties and 
indirect taxes when the end products are exported; 
  Exemption of production waste from import duties and indirect taxes when the 
waste is exported or discarded; 
  Exemption of goods stored in SEZs from duties and indirect taxes; and 
  Non-specific subsidies, including generally applicable tax rates imposed by 
national, regional and local government authorities. 
 
Concerning measures employed in connection with SEZ programs that appear 
inconsistent with WTO disciplines, two prohibited subsidies identified in Article 3 of 
the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures are of greatest concern: 
export subsidies and import substitution or domestic content subsidies. Export 
subsidies are subsidies that are contingent in law or in fact upon export performance. 
Domestic content subsidies are subsidies contingent on the use of domestic goods instead 
of imports. In particular, WTO prohibited government subsidies in connection with SEZ 
programs include (but are not limited to) the following: 
 
  A direct subsidy contingent on export performance; 
  Currency retention schemes involving a bonus on exports; 
  Preferential transport and freight charges for export shipments; 
  Provision of domestic products and services for exports at terms more favorable 
than those for domestic goods; 
  Exemption, remission or deferral of direct taxes or social welfare charges if 
contingent on exports; 
  Allowance of special direct tax deductions for exports above those granted on 
goods for domestic consumption; 
  Exemption or remission of indirect taxes on exports in excess of those on goods 
sold for domestic consumption; 
  Exemption, remission or deferral of prior stage cumulative taxes on goods or 
services used in the production of exported products in excess of products sold for 
domestic consumption (except for the exemption, remission or deferral of such 
taxes on "inputs consumed" in the production process); 
  Provision of export credit guarantees or insurance programs at premium rates 
inadequate to cover long-term costs; 
  Grants of export credits at rates below those which they pay for the funds, or at 
below market rates, or payment of all or part of the costs of obtaining credit; and 
  Subsidies contingent on the use of domestic over imported goods. 
 
  5Concerning measures where WTO consistency depends on the facts of the particular 
case, there are several types of government policies that fall into this category, for 
example:  
 
  Duty and tax free treatment of production equipment used in SEZs;  
  Provision of materials and components in exchange for compensation that may 
not reflect full market value; and  
  Government subsidies for infrastructure development in an SEZ. 
 
It is important to note that WTO disciplines apply only to measures imposed by 
WTO Members, i.e., governmental measures. Today, a majority of SEZs are privately 
owned, developed and operated. Measures imposed by private SEZ operators are not 
subject to WTO disciplines, unless they implement a governmental measure. 
 
In addition to the provisions of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures, a number of other WTO disciplines may apply to SEZ programs in 
developing countries. These include Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment (GATT 
Article I); national treatment (GATT Article III); the limitation of fees and formalities 
connected with importation and exportation to the approximate cost of the services 
rendered (GATT Article VIII(1)); transparency requirements (GATT Article X); the 
elimination of quantitative restrictions (GATT Article XI); the Agreement on Trade-
Related Investment Measures; and the General Agreement on Trade in Services. 
 
This Paper concludes with a set of recommendations on how to achieve WTO 
compliance regarding government measures employed in connection with SEZ programs. 
Possibly the single most important step toward eliminating questionable incentives is 
removing all requirements to export and permitting importation of goods 
manufactured in SEZs into the national customs territory without any restrictions 
other than the application of import duties and taxes. 
 
In the context of this study, it has not been possible to assess the progress developing 
countries have made to date in reforming their SEZ fiscal incentive programs to conform 
to the requirements of the SCM Agreement and other WTO disciplines. This could be a 
topic for subsequent analyses. 
 
  61. Special Economic Zones and the World Trade Organization 
 
The objective of this paper is to provide an overview of World Trade Organization 
disciplines applicable to fiscal incentives and other measures used by the governments of 
developing country WTO Members in connection with Special Economic Zones (SEZs).  
 
WTO disciplines are intended to create an open and transparent international trading 
system in which Members follow rules that generally preclude trade restrictions except 
for negotiated tariffs. The benefits of the WTO system include increased economic 
growth, reduction of costs for consumers, universally recognized and applied trading 
rules, and an effective dispute resolution process. 
 
The basic elements of the WTO system consist of: 
 
  Protection of domestic industries exclusively through tariffs bound against 
increases; 
  Most favored nation (MFN) treatment, requiring that tariffs and  regulations be 
applied without discrimination among Members; 
  National treatment, prohibiting discrimination between imported products and 
domestically produced goods after imported goods are introduced into a 
Member’s economy; 
  Rules of general application regarding subsidies, price discrimination, dutiable 
value, product standards, sanitary and phyto-sanitary regulations, intellectual 
property, safeguards, and other measures affecting trade in goods; 
  An agreement regarding government measures affecting trade in services; 
  A dispute resolution understanding that subjects Members found not in 
compliance with WTO disciplines to possible retaliation; and 
  A permanent organization to administer all WTO agreements. 
 
Export subsidies and subsidies contingent on the use of domestic goods are prohibited 
by the WTO because they have a direct impact on the terms of trade by negating tariffs 
imposed by importing countries and creating barriers for exports to the subsidizer’s or 
third country markets. Similarly, government measures that are inconsistent with MFN 
and national treatment principles or are otherwise contrary to WTO disciplines are 
prohibited.  
1.1 Nature and prevalence of SEZs 
 
SEZs are defined in this paper as geographically delimited areas, frequently physically 
secured, that are usually, but not always, outside the customs territory of the host country. 
They range in size from single factories to large cities. SEZs are under single 
management, either government or private-sector. Businesses located within SEZs are 
normally eligible for benefits such as duty and tax exemptions on goods based on the fact 
that they are physically located within the zone. Different countries have used different 
names for zones with these characteristics. These include “‘industrial free zone’ and 
  7‘export free zone’ in Ireland, ‘maquiladora’ in Mexico, ‘duty free export processing zone’ 
and ‘free export zone’ in the Republic of Korea, ‘export processing zone’ in the 
Philippines, ‘investment promotion zone’ in Sri Lanka, ‘foreign trade zone’ in India and 
‘free zone’ in the United Arab Emirates.”
4 “Development Areas” can also fit the 
definition of SEZ. 
 
SEZs are a long-established part of international trade. “Entrepots,” warehouses where 
merchandise can be stored, manipulated, and in some cases processed, without the 
payment of duties and taxes, have existed for many centuries. City-wide free zones on 
international trade routes were also common. The first modern industrial free zone was 
established in Shannon, Ireland in 1959. Today, SEZ programs exist in most countries 
around the world.  
 
Developing countries have increasingly used SEZs as an important economic 
development tool. A recent survey found over 2,300 SEZs in 119 developing and 
transition countries around the world.
5 Starting in the late 1970s, China used SEZs to 
pioneer new economic policies, provide modern infrastructure and attract investment for 
export-oriented industries.
6 A 2008 WTO trade policy review of China found that as of 
2006 there were 660 SEZs and other development zones authorized by the central 
government and an additional 1,346 development zones approved by local governments.
7 
Following the example of China, Vietnam has also extensively used SEZs to introduce 
new economic policies, provide improved infrastructure and attract investment.  As of 
July 2005, Vietnam had established 124 industrial and export processing zones, attracting 
3,612 investment projects amounting to over $15 billion.
8 But SEZ proliferation is not 
limited to Asia, and significant numbers of zones exist in all World Bank regions 
(Figure 1). 
 
                                                 
4 Michael Engman, Osamu Onodera and Enrico Pinali, Export Processing Zones: Past and Future Role in 
Trade and Development, OECD Trade Policy Working Paper No. 53, TD//TC/WP(2006)39/FINAL, p. 10. 
5 See Gökhan Akinci and James Crittle, Special Economic Zones: Performance, Lessons Learned, and 
Implications for Zone Development (The World Bank Group/FIAS, April 2008). 
6 See, e.g., Meng Guangwen, The Theory and Practice of Free Economic Zones: a Case Study of Tianjin, 
People’s Republic of China (doctoral thesis, Ruprecht-Karls University of Heidelberg, Germany, 2003); 
Edward Graham, Do export processing zones attract FDI and its benefits? The experience from China, 
International Economics and Economic Policy. (Springer-Verlag 2004). 
7 Trade Policy Review China, Report by the Secretariat, WT/TPR.S/199 (16 April 2008), Table AIII.5. 
These zones have various names, such as “Special Economic Zone”, “New Area”, “Open City”, “Border 
City”, Free-Trade Zones”, Export Processing Zones”, “Economic and Technological Development Zones”, 
“Border Economic Cooperative Areas”, etc. The local zones and some of the national zones listed do not 
exempt goods in the zone from duties and taxes and therefore do not fall within this Paper’s definition of 
SEZ. 
8   Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Vietnam, WT/ACC/VNM/48 (27 October 2006), p. 86. 



































Source: Akinci and Crittle, 2008. 
1.2 The multilateral legal framework for SEZs 
 
SEZs are not specifically mentioned by name in any WTO agreement. However, a 
footnote to GATT Article XVI and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures excludes from the definition of “subsidy” the core fiscal benefit typically 
provided by SEZs – an exemption from import duties and taxes on goods exported from 
SEZs.  SEZs as such have not been the subject of any GATT/WTO dispute settlement 
proceeding, although of course subsidies have and can provide some guidance, and SEZ 
programs have not been criticized as WTO inconsistent in WTO trade policy reviews.
9 In 
at least one recent instance, however, SEZ measures were raised in an accession.
10   
 
Each SEZ comprises a unique configuration of individual measures and as such must be 
analyzed at the level of these measures.  In this regard, certain measures imposed by 
some Members in connection with SEZ programs may be in conflict with WTO 
disciplines. Of greatest concern are export subsidies and requirements to use domestic 
over imported goods.  
                                                 
9   See, e.g., Trade Policy Review Report by the Secretariat, China, WT/TPR/S/199 (16 April 2008), pp. 
56,80,87 and Table A.III.5. 
10   See,  Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Ukraine, WT/ACC/UKR/152 (January 2008), 
para 338. Compare, Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Viet Nam, WT/ACC/VNM/48 (27 
October 2006), pp. 34-35, 86-87.  Reportedly, SEZ measures are also an issue in the accession of the 
Russian Federation to the WTO. 
  9 
Prohibited and actionable subsidies are governed by the provisions of GATT Article XVI 
and the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement or 
SCMA). Other WTO disciplines may also be applicable to SEZ programs. These include 
Most Favored Nation (MFN) treatment (GATT Article I); national treatment (GATT 
Article III); the limitation of fees and formalities connected with importation and 
exportation to the approximate cost of the services rendered (GATT Article VIII(1)); 
transparency requirements (GATT Article X); the elimination of quantitative restrictions 
(GATT Article XI); the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures; and the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services.  
1.3 Earlier analysis on SEZs and WTO disciplines 
 
Two recent useful publications discuss in detail the application of certain WTO 
disciplines to SEZ programs. In a published article, Mr. Raul Torres, a legal affairs 
officer in the Development Division of the WTO Secretariat, addresses what Members 
need to do “to bring…free zones into line with the SCM Agreement”.
11  His article does 
not discuss other WTO disciplines potentially applicable to SEZs. In addition, an OECD 
working paper regarding export processing zones discusses the application of WTO 
disciplines to zones.
12  The OECD working paper is limited to a discussion of the SCM 
Agreement, TRIMs and GATS.   
 
This paper’s analysis of the SCM Agreement’s application to SEZ programs differs from 
the Torres and OECD publications in four major respects. First, this paper considers the 
application of specific WTO disciplines to SEZ programs not considered by the earlier 
papers (e.g., most favored nation treatment, national treatment, the requirement that fees 
reflect the approximate cost of services rendered, the prohibition on quantitative 
restrictions). 
 
Second, in their analyses of the application of SCM Agreement disciplines, both prior 
publications accord relatively little weight to the long established status of zones in 
international law as areas outside national customs territory and their wide use in both 
developed and developing countries around the world. As a consequence, both papers 
narrowly construe SCM Agreement, footnote 1’s specific recognition of “the exemption 
of an exported product from duties and taxes borne by the like product when destined for 
domestic consumption” as “not…a subsidy”.  
 
Third, the discussions in both prior publications regarding Article 27.4 export subsidy 
exemptions for notified programs in certain MIC Members are now out of date. In July 
2007, the WTO General Council approved an extension of these exemptions through 
                                                 
11   Raul A. Torres, Free Zones and the World Trade Organization Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures, Global Trade and Customs Journal, vol 2, issue 3 (2007) 
12  Michael Engman, Osamu Onodera and Enrico Pinali, Export Processing Zones: Past and Future Role in 
Trade and Development,, Part III. EPZ Policy and Trade Rules, OECD Trade Policy Working Paper No. 53, 
TD/TC/WP(2006)39/Final (23 May 2007).  




Fourth, this paper applies the basic legal analysis by developing a typology for SEZ 
incentives according to their WTO consistency (green, amber, and red measures) and 
presents a set of recommendations to developing country policy makers on how to 
achieve and maintain WTO compliance. 
 
1.4 Constraints to the analysis and outline 
 
This paper is subject to several constraints. First, the application of WTO disciplines to 
SEZ fiscal incentives has been analyzed based on typical SEZ government incentive 
programs. Since each national incentive program is in some respects unique, conclusions 
based on typical incentives may not be applicable in some instances to specific national 
programs.  
 
Second, because of limited time and resources it has not been possible to assess the 
progress developing countries have made to date in reforming their SEZ fiscal incentive 
programs to conform to the requirements of the SCM Agreement and other WTO 
disciplines. This could be the topic of subsequent studies. 
 
Third, the opinions expressed in this paper regarding the application or non-application of 
WTO disciplines to SEZ incentives provided by Members reflect the views of the authors 
and not necessarily those of WTO Members or the WTO Secretariat. It is possible that a 
future WTO dispute resolution proceeding could reach different conclusions regarding 
the application of WTO disciplines to certain SEZ measures than this paper. 
 
The subsequent discussion falls into four parts. Section 2 reviews the WTO Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, including any exemptions from the 
prohibition on export subsidies. Then, Section 3 turns to other WTO disciplines 
applicable to government measures as applied to SEZ programs. Then, Section 4 
synthesizes the previous analysis and classifies typical government incentives used by 
SEZ programs, such as duty and tax exemptions and tax holidays for businesses and 
infrastructure improvements, into WTO permitted (green light) incentives, incentives 
subject to challenge depending upon the particular facts of the program (amber light) and 
WTO prohibited (red light) incentives.
14  Lastly, Section 5 provides a set of 
recommendations for changing WTO prohibited measures employed by developing 
country Members into non-prohibited measures.   
                                                 
13   WT/L/691 (31 July 2007). 
14   No conclusions regarding the WTO consistency of existing SEZ programs should be drawn from this 
Paper as the WTO consistency of individual SEZ programs should be analyzed based on that program’s 
particular law and facts. 
  11 
2. The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
 
WTO disciplines regarding subsidies are of greatest concern for SEZ programs in 
developing countries. In this context, it is important to note that WTO disciplines apply 
only to measures imposed by WTO Members,
15 i.e., governmental measures. Today, a 
majority of SEZs are privately owned, developed and operated.
16 Measures imposed by 




Zones that are outside national “customs territory” to encourage the development of 
international commerce have existed for many centuries.
18  Import duties and taxes are 
generally not imposed on goods introduced into these zones, and exports of goods from 
these zones are also not subject to duties and taxes unless they are imported into that 
nation’s customs territory.
19  The World Customs Organization’s Revised Kyoto 
Convention codifies international standards for this practice. The Convention defines 
“free zone” as “a part of the territory of a Contracting Party where any goods introduced 
are generally regarded, insofar as import duties and taxes are concerned, as being 
outside the customs territory.”
20  
The WCO’s comments to Specific Annex D, Chapter 2 state:  
"The establishment of free zones is part of an economic policy that encourages the 
flow of investment into a Customs territory for manufacturing and other 
commercial activities. The main purpose of free zones is to promote external 
trade and international commerce by granting relief from duties and taxes on 
goods imported to the territory. Additional benefits are the creation of 
employment in the free zones and the development of associated trade activities. 
 
Goods manufactured in a free zone are often exported. Since exports are 
generally exempt from duties and taxes, this facilitates and encourages the 
development of external trade. Domestic goods meant for export can also be 
admitted to free zones and become entitled to exemption from or repayment of 
internal duties and taxes. In some administrations when processed goods are 
                                                 
15  Countervailing duty laws adopted in accordance with the SCM Agreement may, however, apply to 
subsidized exports from SEZs located in both WTO Member and non Member countries, and 
countervailing duties as per these laws may be imposed in both instances.  
16  See Gökhan Akinci and James Crittle, Special Economic Zones: Performance, Lessons Learned, and 
Implications for Zone Development, supra, p. 18. 
17  Fiscal incentives (e.g., exemptions from obligations to pay duties or taxes) generally are established 
through the domestic law of the host country, and such incentives, even if administered by a private entity, 
remain government measures. 
18 See, e.g., Ibid, p. 9; World Customs Organization (WCO) Revised Kyoto Convention, Specific Annex D, 
Chapter 2 (Free Zones).  
19   Ibid. 
20   Revised Kyoto Convention, Specific Annex D, Chapter 2 
  12removed from free zones for home use, they may sometimes benefit from lower 
rates of import duties and taxes."
21 
In recognition of this long established customary practice,
22 GATT Ad Article XVI and 
the SCM Agreement, footnote 1, exclude national measures that exempt exported 
products from duties and taxes from the definition of “subsidy”:
23  
In accordance with the provisions of Article XVI of GATT 1994 (Note to Article 
XVI) and the provisions of Annexes I through III of this Agreement, the exemption 
of an exported product from duties or taxes borne by the like product when 
destined for domestic consumption, or the remission of such duties or taxes in 
amounts not in excess of those which have accrued, shall not be deemed to be a 
subsidy. 
 
How broad is this exclusion? Does it cover exemptions of indirect taxes on inputs that are 
consumed in production and waste? Does it cover exemptions of import duties and taxes 
on production equipment? Does it cover exemptions of direct taxes and social welfare 
charges paid by businesses located in SEZs when those exemptions specifically relate to 
exports? Does it cover the provision by governments of products or services for use in 
exported goods on terms or conditions more favorable than for the production of goods 
for domestic consumption? The answers to these questions require a detailed examination 
of the SCM Agreement. 
2.1 Overview of the SCM Agreement and its applicability to SEZ measures  
 
The SCM Agreement establishes multilateral disciplines concerning the provision of 
subsidies and unilateral countervailing measures imposed to offset injury caused by 
subsidized imports.
24  The Agreement defines the terms “subsidy” and “specific subsidy” 
and divides all specific subsidies into either prohibited subsidies or actionable 
subsidies.
25 The SCM Agreement provides for special and differential treatment for 
developing countries and transition rules for formerly centrally-planned economy 
ountries. 
                                                
c
 
Subsidies and specific subsidies. The SCM Agreement defines “subsidy” as a (1) 
financial contribution (2) by a government or public body (3) conferring a benefit to a 
recipient.
26 In addition, a subsidy must be “specific” to be subject to the disciplines of the 
Agreement.
27 A de jure specific subsidy exists when it is explicitly limited to certain 
 
21   Comments to the Revised Kyoto Convention (WCO 2003). 
22   Customary international law consists of rules derived from the consistent conduct of States.  
23   Footnote 1 also applies to the drawback of duties and taxes and similar customs procedures. 
24   See generally, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (“SCM Agreement”), 
http://wto.org/english/tratop_e/scm_e.htm.   
25  The SCM Agreement originally included a third category, non-actionable subsidies, that expired as of 
31 December 1999. 
26  SCM Agreement, Article 1.  
27  Ibid, Articles 1.2, 2.  
  13enterprises. A subsidy that is not de jure specific can still be de facto specific if it is used 
is applicable to subsidies provided to 
nterprises located within SEZs. In addition, any subsidy falling under Article 3, 
rohibited subsidies. Two types of subsidies are prohibited by the SCM Agreement: 
is included in Annex I of the SCM 
greement. Annex I export subsidy programs are summarized below.  For the full legal 
r similar schemes involving a bonus on exports 
 than for the production of like domestic goods, if 
to exporters 
ts in excess of those levied on the production and distribution 
onsumption. (This is not applicable to prior-stage cumulative indirect 
                                                
only by a limited number of businesses.  
 
There are four types of specificity:
28 (1) enterprise specificity; (2) industry specificity; (3) 
regional specificity; (4) prohibited subsidies. “A subsidy which is limited to certain 
enterprises located within a designated geographic region within the jurisdiction of the 
granting authority” is specific.
29 This clearly 
e




export subsidies and local content subsidies.  
 
Export subsidies are defined as subsidies that are contingent in law or in fact on export 
performance.
31  An illustrative list of export subsidies 
A
description, the text of Annex I should be consulted:
32 
 
  Direct subsidies to a firm or industry contingent on export performance 
  Currency retention o
  Internal transport and freight charges for exports on terms more favorable than for 
domestic shipments 
  The provision of goods and services for the use in the production of exported 
goods on terms more favorable
the terms or conditions are more favorable than those commercially available on 
the world markets 
  Exemptions, remissions or deferrals of direct taxes or social welfare charges 
related to exports 
  Allowance of special tax deductions related to exports above those granted 
regarding production for domestic consumption 
  The exemption or remission of indirect taxes regarding the production and 
distribution of expor
of like products sold for domestic consumption (e.g., excessive remission of 
value-added taxes). 
  The exemption, remission or deferral of prior-stage cumulative indirect taxes on 
goods and services used in the production of exported products in excess of the 
exemption, remission or deferral of such taxes levied on like products for 
domestic c
taxes levied on inputs that are consumed in the production of the exported 
product.)  
 
28 Subsidy specificity is assessed at the level of the subsidy-granting authority. 
29  Ibid, Article 2.2. 
30  Ibid, Article 2.3. 
31  SCM Agreement, Article 3(a). and Annex I. 
32  See Annex  G of this Paper for the text of Annex I. 
  14  The remission or drawback of import charges in excess of those levied on
imported inputs that are consumed in the production of the exported product. 
(However, “substitution
 
 drawback” is allowed.) 
e risk 
erating 
ers or financial institutions in obtaining export credits. 
(However, certain export credit practices in conformity with the interest rate 
X) was challenged by Canada as a 
rohibited export subsidy. The Panel and Appellate Body found that the program 
ntent 
quirements were inconsistent with the prohibition on the use of domestic over imported 
“standing” requirements other than for a Member “to believe that a prohibited subsidy is 
  The provision of export credit guarantee or insurance programs or exchang
programs at premium rates which are inadequate to cover the long-term op
costs of the programs. 
  Grants of export credits at below-market rates or the payment of the costs 
incurred by export




During the first twelve years of the WTO, only one WTO dispute settlement case 
involved alleged prohibited subsidies maintained by MIC Members. In Brazil-Aircraft, 
DS46 (1999), Brazil’s payments for aircraft exports under the interest rate component of 
a Brazilian export financing program (PROE
p
constituted a prohibited export subsidy and ordered Brazil to withdraw the subsidies 
within 90 days of the adoption of their rulings.
34 
 
Prohibited local content subsidies involve the use of domestic over imported goods.
35  
Two recent WTO dispute settlement proceedings have involved alleged MIC local 
content subsidies.  In 2007, the United States challenged a number of measures 
maintained by China providing for refunds, deductions or exemptions from taxes on the 
condition that enterprises purchased domestic over imported goods.
36 Although these 
benefits were made available to businesses in SEZs, SEZs were not mentioned in the 
request for an establishment of a panel. The dispute was settled when China withdrew the 
measures in question.
37 In 2008, in China-Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile 
Parts, a WTO Panel considered whether measures applied by China imposing a higher 
customs duty on parts imports if automobile manufacturers did not meet domestic co
re
goods provision in the SCM Agreement.
38 The Panel found other violations in the case 
and in the interests of “judicial economy” did not decide the domestic content issue. 
 
Expedited dispute settlement. The SCM Agreement contains special, expedited dispute 
settlement rules and procedures pertaining to prohibited subsidy allegations. In contrast to 
normal WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) procedures, there are no 
                                                 
33 Although the Illustrative List does not refer to the OECD Arrangement as such, a number of WTO 
disputes have established that this is the only "international undertaking" with the characteristics referred to 
2.15 of the DSU found that Brazil’s revised PROEX 
ibited subsidy. 
 WT/DS/342/R (July 18, 2008). 
in the Illustrative List. 
34  Subsequent proceedings pursuant to Article 
payments did not constitute a proh
35  SCM Agreement, Article 3(b). 
36   WT/DS358/13 (13 July 2007).  
37   WT/DS358/14 (4 January 2008). 
38   WT/DS/339/R, WT/DS/340/R,
  15being granted or maintained.”
39  In addition, unless otherwise prescribed, the time 
periods applicable for the conduct of disputes are half the time normally prescribed under 
the DSU.
40  In the event of a complaint, consultations between the parties must take place 
as quickly as possible
41 and if no solution has been reached within 30 days the matter 
may be referred to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) for the immediate establishment 
of a panel.
42 The panel’s report must be circulated within 90 days of the date of its 
composition.
43 “If the measure in question is found to be a prohibited subsidy, the panel 
shall recommend that the subsidizing Member withdraw the subsidy without delay.”
44 In 
the event that the recommendation of the DSB is not followed within the specified time 
period, “the DSB shall grant authorization to the complaining Member to take 
ppropriate countermeasures, unless the DSB decides by consensus to reject the 
eement, Articles 3, 5 and 6, for 9 years, counted from 
anuary 1, 1995.  These, and all other agricultural export subsidies, are now fully 
e through the DSU can be based on any of these types of 
dverse effects while countervailing measures can only be based on the first type, injury 





Under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, certain export subsidies were exempt from 
the provisions of the SCM Agr
46 J
subject to the SCM Agreement. 
 
Actionable subsidies and their remedies. Actionable subsidies may be challenged either 
through the DSU or through unilateral countervailing proceedings if they cause adverse 
effects to other Members. There are three types of adverse effects: (1) injury to a 
domestic industry manufacturing like products that occurs in the territory of the 
complaining Member; (2) “serious prejudice” such as export displacement in a third 
country market; and (3) “nullification or impairment” of benefits accruing under GATT, 
such as when improved market access from a bound tariff reduction is counteracted by 
subsidization. A challeng
a
to a domestic industry.    
 
Countervailing measures. A Member may not impose a countervailing measure (e.g., a 
countervailing duty on imports) without first making three factual determinations: (1) the 
existence of subsidized imports; (2) injury to a domestic injury producing like products; 
and (3) a causal link between the subsidized imports and the injury. The effects of 
subsidized imports from more than one Member may be cumulated. Articles 10-23 of the 
SCM Agreement establish procedures for conducting investigations and imposing 
countervailing measures. Of significance to developing countries, countervailing 
investigations of imports from developing country Members are to be terminated if the 
overall level of subsidies granted does not exceed 2 percent of the product’s value on a 
 
39   SCM Agreement, Article 4.1. 
40   Ibid, Article 4.12. 
41   Ibid, Article 4.3. 
42   Ibid, Article 4.4. 
43   Ibid, Article 4.6. 
44   Ibid, Article 4.7. 
45   Ibid, Article 4.10. A footnote to this provision states that countermeasures that are disproportionate are 
not permitted. 
46   Agreement on Agriculture, Articles 1(f) and 13(c). 
  16per unit basis or the volume of subsidized imports represents less than 4 percent of the 
total imports of the like product (unless subsidized imports from two or more developing 
ountry Members with individual market shares less than 4 percent collectively amount 
nature of the measure itself” (Article 25.7). If Members believe 
there are no measures that require notification, they must inform the WTO Secretariat in 
rted goods. 
rticle 29, now also expired, provided for a 7 year phase-out period for prohibited 
 Box  1. It is likely, however, that these other SDT provisions would be 
terpreted as not providing additional SDT exemptions beyond those provided in 
Article 27.  
c
to more than 9 percent of total imports).
47  
 
Notifications.  The SCM Agreement imposes extensive notification requirements 
regarding specific subsidies and countervailing duty measures. The Agreement requires 
that members notify all specific subsidies to the SCM Committee by 30 June of each year 
with sufficient detail to allow other Members to evaluate the trade effects and understand 
the operation of the notified programs (Article 25.1 and 25.2)
48. “Members recognize that 
notification of a measure does not prejudge either its legal status …., the effects under 
this Agreement, or the 
writing (Article 25.6).  
2.2 Special and differential treatment for developing country Members 
 
Special and differential treatment (SDT) is intended to improve market access for 
developing countries and to give them more flexibility regarding trade-related measures 
by exempting them from certain multilateral disciplines.
49 In general, the Uruguay Round 
reduced most SDT treatment for developing countries to extended transition periods to 
implement new disciplines.
50 The SCM Agreement, Article 27, is an example. Article 27 
includes both exemptions from the prohibition on export subsidies for certain low-income 
countries and phase-in periods for middle-income countries. A phase-in period, now 
expired, was also included for the prohibition on the use of domestic over impo
A
subsidies for centrally-planned economies transitioning to market economies. 
 
In addition to Articles 27 and 29 of the SCM Agreement, three other SDT provisions may 
apply to government incentives offered by developing countries in connection with SEZs. 
These are (1) GATT Article XVIII, Government Assistance to Economic Development; 




                                                 
47   SCM Agreement, Article 27.10. 
48   The WTO Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures requires that Members provide new 
and full notifications every two years and conduct reviews of these notifications in the alternate years.  
49   See generally, T. Ademola Oyejide, Special and Differential Treatment, Development, Trade, and the 
WTO: a Handbook (ed. Hoekman, Mattoo and English, World Bank 2002). For an overview of the WTO’s 
SDT provisions, see Implementation of Special and Differential Treatment Provisions in WTO Agreements 
and Decisions, WT/COMTD/W/77 (25 October 2000). 
50   Ibid, p.507. 
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Box 1: Special and differential treatment in addition to  
the SCM Agreement Articles 27 and 29  
 
GATT Article XVIII 
 
GATT Article XVIII was the original privilege accorded to developing countries. It 
permits deviation from the requirements of GATT, excepting Article I (MFN 
treatment), Article II (schedules of concessions) and Article XIII (non-discriminatory 
administration of quantitative restrictions).  Under Section D, a country that is in the 
process of development but is not a low income country and that seeks to establish a 
particular industry may request approval of the proposed measure. The Doha 
Ministerial reaffirmed the application of XVIII to developing countries. 
WT/MIN(01)/17 (20 November 2001). However, since the SCM Agreement, Article 
27, is a later specific interpretation of WTO disciplines, it is doubtful that the WTO 
would interpret GATT Article XVIII as providing a separate and additional SDT 
exemption for government subsidies. 
 
  GATT, Part IV (Articles XXXVI-XXXVIII) 
 
GATT Article XXXVI states in pertinent part that “There is need for a rapid and 
sustained expansion of the export earnings of the less-developed contracting parties.” 
XXXVI.2.  “The developed contracting parties do not expect reciprocity for 
commitments made to them in trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other 
barriers to trade of less-developed contracting parties” XXXVI.8. In the past 
developing countries have relied on these principles in applications for waivers of 
WTO/GATT commitments. However, since the SCM Agreement is a later specific 
interpretation of WTO disciplines it is doubtful that the WTO would interpret GATT, 
Part IV as providing a separate and additional SDT exemption for government 
subsidies.  
 
  The “Enabling Clause” 
 
The “Enabling Clause”
51 provides in pertinent part that “Differential and more 
favourable treatment with respect to the provisions of the General Agreement 
concerning non-tariff measures governed by the provisions of instruments multilateral 
negotiated under the auspices of the GATT” may be accorded to developing countries. 
Its application to LDCs in addition to Uruguay Round instruments was reaffirmed in 
the Uruguay Round Agreement.
52 However, since the SCM Agreement is a later 
specific interpretation of WTO disciplines it is doubtful that the WTO would interpret 
the Enabling Clause as providing a separate and additional SDT exemption for 
government subsidies. 
 
                                                 
51   GATT Contracting Parties, Decision of November 28, 1979 on Differential and More Favourable 
Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation on Developing Countries, GATT B.I.S.D. (26
th Supp.) at 
203 (1980). 
52   See Decision on Measures in Favour of Least-Developed Countries, Uruguay Round. 
  18Article 27 of the SCM Agreement. Developing country Members that utilize export 
subsidies are accorded special and differential treatment (SDT) in the SCM Agreement in 
several ways, based upon their level of development: 
 
  Least developed countries (LDCs) are excluded from the prohibition on export 
subsidies.  
  Certain countries named in Annex VII(b) to the SCM Agreement are excluded 
from the prohibition on export subsidies until their GNP per capita exceeds USD 
$1,000 in 1990 dollars for 3 consecutive years, subject to certain “graduation” 
and “re-inclusion” provisions.
53 
  A number of other developing countries are not subject to the prohibition on 
export subsidies for certain identified programs, subject to notification, 




These exceptions are discussed in more detail below. 
 
Annex VII(a) Members. Least developed country members of the WTO are exempted 
from the prohibition on export subsidies. Article 27.2 of the SCM Agreement provides 
that “The prohibition of paragraph 1(a) of Article 3 shall not apply to (a) developing 
country Members referred to in Annex VII.” (Article 3.1(a) is the prohibition on export 
subsidies.) Annex VII (a) references “Least-developed countries designated as such by 
the United Nations which are Members of the WTO.” The United Nations currently lists 
50 nations as LDCs;
55 33 of these are WTO members. Of the remaining 17, 12 are in 
various stages of the WTO accession process. See Table 1. 
 
LDC Members that reach export competitiveness in any given product must gradually 
phase out export subsidies over a period of 8 years for that product.
56. LDCs are not 
exempted from the prohibition on subsidies contingent upon the use of domestic over 
imported goods imposed by SCM Agreement Article 3.1(b) and 3.2.  This exemption 
expired at the end of 2003. See SCM Agreement Article 27.3. 
 
 
                                                 
53   WT/MIN(01)/17, para. 10.1. 
54   See General Council decision of 31 July 2007, WT/L/691.  
55   http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/list.htm 
56   See SCM Agreement Article 27.5, 27.6, WT/MIN(01)/17, para 10.5.  Pursuant to Article 27.6 of the 
SCM Agreement, export competitiveness exists if exports of a product have reached a share of at least 
3.25% in world trade for that product for two consecutive calendar years. It should be noted, however, that 
there is considerable uncertainty over the correct legal interpretation of the definition of a "product" in this 
context because of an apparent conflict in the three official texts of the SCM Agreement.  In the English 
version of Article 27.6 , a "product" is defined as a "section heading" of the Harmonized System 
Nomenclature, although the Harmonized System itself contains "headings" (4-digit tariff lines), and 
"sections" (groups of chapters).  The Spanish and French versions refer respectively to "partidas" and 
"positions", both corresponding to the 4-digit HS level.  The issue has been discussed in the SCM 
Committee, but no consensus view has emerged.  It is much more likely that a given developing Member 
would reach export competitiveness in a product if a product is defined at the 4-digit HS level than if it is 
defined at the broader section level. 
  19Table 1:  
Countries exempted from the prohibition of export subsidies in the  
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
Least developed country WTO Members 
(SCM Art. 27.2(a) and Annex VII(a)) 
Members with a per capita GNP<$1,000** 




Burkina Faso  Cote d’Ivoire 
Burundi Egypt 
Cambodia Ghana 
Cape Verde  Guyana 
Central African Republic   Honduras 
Chad India 


















Sierra Leone   
Solomon Islands   
Togo  
Uganda  
United Republic of Tanzania   
Zambia  
*) As of 28 July 2008.  In addition, 12 LDCs are in the process of WTO accession: Afghanistan, Bhutan, 
Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Liberia, Samoa, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Sudan, Vanuatu, Yemen. **) In 1990-US Dollars. 




  20Annex VII(b) Members In addition to LDCs, Article 27.2(a) and Annex VII(b) name 20 
WTO Members which are not subject to the prohibition on export subsidies until “GNP 
per capita has reached $1,000 per annum: Bolivia, Cameroon, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Dominican Republic, Egypt, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Kenya, 
Morocco, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Senegal, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe.” 
Honduras, which had been erroneously omitted from the original list, was subsequently 
added on January 20, 2001.  
 
When the SCM Agreement went into effect in 1995, the interpretation of the SCM 
Committee was that the $1,000 threshold reflected current US dollars. However, this 
interpretation meant that Members could graduate based upon inflation and changes in 
exchange rates rather than on real economic growth. As a consequence, at the Doha 
Ministerial in 2001 the WTO adopted an alternative approach, calculating the $1,000 
threshold in constant 1990 US dollars, which must be reached for three consecutive 
years.
57 It was also agreed that Members that graduate will be re-included in the list if 
their “GNP per capita falls back below US $1,000.”
58 The most recent threshold 
calculation by the Committee was released in December 2007.
59 Based upon this 
calculation, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala and Morocco have graduated and the 
other 18 countries listed remain exempted from the export subsidy prohibition. See 
Table 1.  
 
Annex VII(b) Members that reach export competitiveness in any given product must 
gradually phase out export subsidies for that product over a period of 8 years.
60 This may 
be of particular significance to Annex VII(b) countries with large, growing export-
oriented economies, such as India, Indonesia, the Philippines, Egypt, and Pakistan. 
Annex VII(b) Members are not exempted from the prohibition on subsidies contingent 
upon the use of domestic over imported goods imposed by SCM Agreement Article 
3.1(b) and 3.2.  This exemption expired after five years – on December 31, 2000 – for 
non-LDCs. See SCM Agreement Article 27.3. 
 
Article 27.4 Members. Developing countries other than Annex VII countries (including 
those that have graduated from Annex VII(b)) were required by the SCM Agreement, 
Article 27.4, to phase out their export subsidies within an eight year period (i.e., by 
December 31, 2002). However, a mechanism for an extension beyond that date was 
provided by Article 27.4, based upon a timely application to and agreement by the SCM 
Committee.  
 
In 2001, a special procedure was implemented to meet the needs of certain small 
developing countries.
61  Programs eligible for extensions were export subsidy programs 
as follows: 
                                                 
57   WT/MIN(01)/17 (20 November 2001), para. 10.1. As of 1 January 2003 the calculation methodology in 
G/SCM/38, Appendix 2 applies. G/SCM/110/Add.4 (21 December 2007). 
58   Ibid, para. 10.4. 
59   G/SCM/110/Add.4 (21 December 2007). 
60   See SCM Agreement Article 27.5, 27.6, WT/MIN(01)/17, para 10.5. 
61   See Implementation-Related Issues and Concerns, WT/MIN(01)/17 (20 November 2001), para 10.6; 
G/SCM/39 (20 November 2001).  The special procedure was used to grant extensions over a period of five 
  21(i)  in the form of full or partial exemptions from import duties and internal 
taxes 
(ii)  which came into existence not later than 1 September 2001, and 
(iii)  which were provided by developing country Members 
(iv)  whose share of world merchandise export trade was not greater than 0.1%  
(v)  whose total Gross National Income (“GNI”) for the year 2000 as 
published by the World Bank was at or below US $20 billion 
(vi)  and that were otherwise eligible to request an extension pursuant to Article 
27.4, and 
(vii)  that followed the procedures prescribed by the SCM Committee in WTO 
document G/SCM/39. 
 
Members that met all the qualifications were eligible for a 5-year extension of the 
transition period (i.e., to December 31, 2007) plus the additional 2 year phase-out period 
provided for in Article 27.4 (i.e., to December 31, 2009).  In July 2007, the WTO General 
Council approved an extension of these procedures through 31 December 2013, with the 
final two-year phase-out period ending not later than 31 December 2015.
62 Under the 
July 2007 decision continuing the procedures, the Members receiving the extensions 
agreed not to seek any further extensions past the end of 2015 and to eliminate their 
export subsidies no later than that date.  
                                                                                                                                                
 
The developing countries currently receiving extensions of the transition period for 
certain such programs are Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, 
El Salvador, Fiji, Guatemala, Jamaica, Jordan, Mauritius, Panama, Papua New Guinea, St. 
Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Uruguay.
63 Three additional Members that had not 
provided documentation supporting an extension, Antigua & Barbuda, Grenada and St. 
Vincent & the Grenadines, were given additional time by the Committee to submit 
documentation. In addition, certain Annex VII countries reserved their rights to invoke 
the same procedures in the event that they subsequently “graduated” from the Annex 
VII(b) exemption. See Table 2. 
 
In a number of cases, the incentive programs notified related to Special Economic Zone 
measures. Antigua and Barbuda notified its “Free Trade/Processing Zones” program. 
Belize notified its “Export Processing Zone Act and Commercial Free Zone Act.” Costa 
Rica notified its “Duty Free Zone regime”. The Dominican Republic notified “Law No. 
8-90, to Promote the Establishment of Free Trade Zones.” Fiji notified its “Export 
Processing Factories/Zones Scheme.” Guatemala notified “Free Zones” and “Industrial 
and Free Trade Zones (ZOLIC)”. Jamaica notified its “Jamaica Export Free Zone Act.” 
Mauritius notified its “Freeport Scheme.” Panama notified its “Export Processing Zone”. 
And St. Lucia notified its “Free Zone Act.”  
 
years to certain Members for certain programs.  In addition, four Members obtained one-year extensions for 
certain of their programs pursuant to Article 27.4 alone (i.e., not on the basis of the special procedure). 
These Members were Barbados, El Salvador, Panama, and Thailand.  See, G/SCM/95-98;G/SCM/99; 
G/SCM/100; and G/SCM/101   Suppls. 1 and 2, and G/SCM/102.  
62   WT/L/691 (31 July 2007). 
63   Report (2007) of the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, G/L/840 (12 November 
2007). 
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Table 2: 
Countries with a Further Extension of the Transition Period for Export Subsidies (SCM Art. 27.4) 
WTO Member  Notified Programs (bolded if concerning SEZs)  WTO Action 
Antigua & 
Barbuda 
Free Trade/Processing Zones. Fiscal Incentives Act  Extensions 
granted 
Barbados  Fiscal Incentive Program. Export Allowance. Research & Development 
Allowance. International Business Incentives. Societies with Restricted 
Liability. Export Re-discount Facility. Export Credit Insurance Scheme. 
Export Finance Guarantee Scheme. Export Grant & Incentive Scheme. 
Extensions 
granted 
Belize  Export Processing Zone Act. Commercial Free Zone Act. Fiscal Incentives 





Free Zone. Temporary Admission Regime for Inward Processing.  Reservation  
of rights 








Law to Promote the Establishment of Free Trade Zones.  Extension 
granted 
El Salvador  Export Processing Zones & Marketing Act.  Extension 
granted 




Grenada  Fiscal Incentives Act. Qualified Enterprise Act. Statutory Rules and Orders.  Extension 
granted 






Free Trade Zone of Puerto Cortes. Export Processing Zones. Temporary 
Import Regime.  
Reservation  
of rights 
Jamaica  Export Free Zone Act. Export Industry Encouragement Act. Foreign Sales 
Corporation Act. Industrial Incentives Act.  
Extension 
granted 








Mauritius  Freeport Scheme. Export Enterprise Scheme. Pioneer Status Enterprise 
Scheme. Export Promotion. 
Extension 
granted 




Income Tax Act  Extension 
granted 
Sri Lanka  
(Annex VII(b)) 
Income Tax Concessions. Tax Holidays & Profits Generated. 
Concessionary Tax on Dividends. Indirect Tax Concessions-Internal Tax 
Exemptions. Export Development Investment Support Scheme. Import 
Duty Exemption. Exemption from Exchange Control. 
Reservation  
of rights 
St. Kitts & Nevis  Fiscal Incentives Act.   Extension 
granted 




St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines 
Fiscal Incentives Act  Extension 
granted 
Uruguay  Automotive Industry Export Promotion Regime.  Extension 
granted 
Sources: Subsidies Enforcement Annual Report to the US Congress (February 2008); WTO notifications. 
  23The notification of SEZ programs pursuant to Article 27.4 to the SCM Committee does 
not constitute an admission that these programs are in fact prohibited subsidies. As noted 
previously, SCMA Article 25.7 provides that “Members recognize that notification of a 
measure does not prejudge either its legal status …., the effects under this Agreement, or 
the nature of the measure itself.” (emphasis added) The most common SEZ incentive – 
the exemption of exported products from import duties or taxes assessed on like products 
shipped from the SEZ for domestic consumption – is excluded from the definition of 
subsidy. However, corporate tax holidays and similar incentives may be prohibited 
subsidies if they are contingent in law or fact on export performance. Notably, the 
existence of export requirements, or restrictions on selling products from the SEZ into the 
domestic market, would constitute such a contingency on export performance. 
 
Article 27.4 countries must phase out export subsidies for products that have reached 
“export competitiveness” over a period of two years.
64 Export competitiveness exists if 
exports of the product have reached a share of at least 3.25% in world trade for that 
product for two consecutive calendar years.
65 It seems unlikely that the small economies 
that qualify under Article 27.4 will reach this level of world trade for any exports. Article 
27.4 countries are not exempted from the prohibition on subsidies contingent upon the 
use of domestic over imported goods imposed by SCM Agreement Article 3.1(b) and 3.2.  
This exemption expired after 5 years. See SCM Agreement Article 27.3. 
 
Transformation to a Market Economy. Article 29 of the SCM Agreement provides 
special transition rules for Members in the process of transforming from a centrally-
planned economy to a market economy. Subsidy programs that are covered by Article 3 
were required to be phased out by December 31, 2002. In “exceptional circumstances” 
additional time could have be granted
66, but no requests for such extensions were 
received. 
 
Recent Accessions. A number of non-LDC developing countries, some with a per capital 
GNP of less than $1,000 in 1990 dollars, have acceded to the WTO during the 12 years 
since the WTO came into existence. These include Albania (2000), Armenia (2003), 
China (2001), Georgia (2000), Kyrgyz Republic (1998), FYR of Macedonia (2003), 
Moldova (2001), Mongolia (1997), Tonga (2007), Ukraine (2008), and Vietnam (2007).  
Almost all of these recent accessions are countries in the process of transforming from a 
centrally-planned economy to a market economy. However, these new Members were 
generally required to eliminate all prohibited subsidies as a condition of accession.
67  
 
Doha Development Round Negotiations. As a part of the DDR negotiations, the WTO 
Rules Negotiating Group is currently considering various proposals to revise the SCM 
                                                 
64   Article 27.5. 
65   Article 27.6. 
66   Article 29.4. 
67   See, e.g., Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China, WT/ACC/CHN/49 (1 October 2001), 
p. 33; Report of the Working Party on the Accession of the FYR of Macedonia, WT/ACC/807/27 (26 
September 2002), p. 24; Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Ukraine, WT/ACC/UKR/152 (25 
January 2008) pp. 63-64; Report of the Working Party on the Accession of Vietnam, WT/ACC/VNM/48 
(27 October 2006), pp. 72, 92, 93. 
  24Agreement. Some developed country Members have proposed expansion of the category 
of prohibited subsidies.
68 In November 2007, the Chairman circulated a proposed text
69 
and this became the focus of intensified negotiations. It is not possible to predict what 
changes to existing subsidy disciplines, if any, may result from these negotiations.  
 
3. Other WTO Provisions of Relevance for SEZs  
3.1 Most favored nation treatment; GATT Article I 
 
A cornerstone of the WTO system is the most favored nation (MFN) principle. It is a 
legal requirement to accord equal treatment to all Member nations regarding covered 
trade measures. (WTO approved regional trade agreements are an exception. See GATT 
Article XXIV.)  The MFN principle applies to trade in goods (GATT Article I), trade in 
services (GATS Article II) and the protection of intellectual property rights (TRIPS 
Article 4). The denial of MFN treatment has been an issue in a number of WTO disputes. 
See, e.g., EC – Bananas III, DS27 (1997) (export certificate requirements accorded an 
advantage to some Members only); Indonesia-Autos, DS54, DS55, DS59, DS64 (1998) 
(duty and sales exemptions accorded to Korean auto imports were not accorded 
unconditionally to like products from other Members). 
 
The MFN principle might be contravened if a government imposes measures that 
discriminate in law or fact between goods (or services) based upon the country of 
origin. 
3.2 National treatment; GATT Article III 
 
A second cornerstone of the WTO system is the national treatment principle. National 
treatment imposes an obligation of non-discrimination between domestic and imported 
goods. It is a principle incorporated in GATT, Article III and GATS, Article XVII. The 
denial of national treatment has been a frequent issue in WTO disputes. See, e.g., Japan-
Alcoholic Beverages II, DS8, DS10, DS 11 (1996)(Japan taxed shochu – an indigenous 
alcohol – at a lower rate than imported alcoholic beverages); Indonesia-Autos, DS54, 
DS55, DS59, DS64 (1998)(Indonesian cars taxed at a lower rate than imported cars). 
Prohibited subsidies involving the purchase of domestic over imported goods also may 
contravene GATT Article III. See, e.g., China-Certain Measures Granting Refunds, 
Reductions or Exemptions from Taxes and Other Payments, WT/DS/358/13 (2007). The 
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, discussed below, also prohibits 
measures inconsistent with national treatment. 
 
The national treatment principle might be contravened if a government imposes 
measures that discriminate in favor of domestic over foreign goods or services. 
 
                                                 
68   See Subsidies Enforcement Annual Report to the Congress, Joint Report of the Office of the United 
States Trade Representative and the U.S. Department of Commerce, February 2008. 
69   See TN/RL/W/213. 
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GATT Article VIII(1)(a) provides that fees and charges of whatever character (other than 
duties and taxes) connected with importation and exportation must be limited to the 
approximate cost of services rendered. This principle would be contravened if a 
government imposed fees that exceeded the fully allocated cost of the services rendered. 
See, e.g., Argentina-Textiles and Apparel, DS56 (1998)(statistical tax on imports 
exceeded the approximate cost of the services rendered and was a measure designed for 
fiscal purposes). 
 
The “fees limited to the approximate cost of the services rendered principle” might 
be contravened if a government imposes fees on the processing of imports and 
exports in excess of the approximate cost of the services rendered.  
 
3.4 Transparency; GATT Article X 
 
GATT Article X imposes various requirements including the publication and 
administration of trade regulations. Laws, regulations, judicial decisions and 
administrative rulings relating to import and export matters, duty and tax rates and other 
charges, or “their sale, distribution, transportation, insurance, warehousing, inspection, 
exhibition, processing, mixing or other use” must be published promptly to enable 
governments and traders to become acquainted with them. Article X(1).  The failure to 
publish violates this requirement. See, e.g., Dominican Republic-Import and Sale of 
Cigarettes, DS302 (2005)(selective consumption tax contrary to GATT Article X(1)). 
 
The “transparency” requirement might be contravened if a government imposes 
generally applicable trade requirements that have not been published.  
 
3.5 Elimination of quantitative restrictions; GATT Article XI 
 
GATT Article XI prohibits quotas, import and export licenses, and other measures 
(excepting duties, taxes and other charges) that prohibit or restrict trade. This broad 
prohibition applies to restrictions on the importation or exportation of goods. For 
example, in India-Quantitative Restrictions, DS90 (1999), the Panel found that India’s 
discretionary import licensing system and other measures amounted to quantitative 
restrictions inconsistent with GATT Article XI(1). Similarly, in Turkey-Textiles, DS34 
(1999), quantitative restrictions on textile imports from India were found to be 
inconsistent with GATT Articles XI and XIII. 
 
There are three exceptions in Article XI to the prohibition on quantitative restrictions. 
First, Members may apply restrictions temporarily to prevent or relieve critical shortages 
of food or other essential products. Second, Members may apply restrictions necessary to 
the application of standards or regulations for the classification, grading or marketing of 
commodities in international trade. Third, Members may apply restrictions on agricultural 
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exceptions to Article XI are contained in GATT Article XII (restrictions to safeguard 
balance of payments), Article XX (general exceptions), Article XXI (security exceptions), 
and the Agreement on Safeguards. The Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures 
regulates the administration of import quotas. 
 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, discussed below, also prohibits 
quantitative restrictions inconsistent with Article XI. 
 
The quantitative restrictions prohibition might be contravened if a government 
implements measures that prohibit or restrict certain imports or exports and those 
restrictions are not justified by applicable WTO exceptions. 
 
3.6 Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) 
 
TRIMs “applies to governmental investment measures related to the trade in goods 
only.”
70 TRIMs clarifies the application of GATT Article III regarding national treatment 
and GATT Article XI regarding quantitative restrictions.
71 Article 2 of TRIMs prohibits 
trade-related investment measures inconsistent with GATT Article III (national 
treatment) and XI (quantitative restrictions). The Annex lists 5 TRIMs that are 
inconsistent with national treatment and the elimination of quantitative restrictions. 
TRIMs inconsistent with national treatment include governmental measures regarding: 
 
  purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or any domestic 
source, whether specified in terms of product identity, volume or value of 
products, or a proportion of volume or value of its local production (local content 
requirements) 
  limitation of an enterprise’s purchase or use of imported products to an amount 
related to the volume or value of the local products that it exports (trade balancing 
requirements) 
 
TRIMs inconsistent with the elimination of quantitative restrictions include governmental 
measures regarding: 
 
  importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production 
in an amount related to the volume or value of local production it exports (trade 
balancing requirements) 
  importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local production 
by restricting its access to foreign exchange to an amount related to the foreign 
exchange inflows attributable to the enterprise (foreign exchange restrictions) 
                                                 
70   TRIMs, Article 1. 
71   See Bijit Bora, Trade-Related Investment Measures, in Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo, Philip 
English, Development, Trade, and the WTO (World Bank 2002). 
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particular products, in terms of volume or value, or in terms of proportion of 
volume or value of its local production 
 
Article 4 provides that developing country Members are free to deviate temporarily from 
the provisions of Article 2 (the requirement to accord national treatment and the 
prohibition on quantitative restrictions) as may be permitted by GATT Article XVIII (the 
infant industry provision), and for balance of payments purposes. In addition, Article 5.3 
provides for extensions regarding the elimination of TRIMs for developing and LDC 




TRIMs might be contravened if a government imposes investment measures that 
discriminate in favor of domestic over foreign goods and/or impose quantitative 
restrictions related to local production. 
 
3.7 General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 
 
GATS applies to government measures affecting trade in services.
73 It covers all services 
except for those provided by government.
74 An understanding of GATS is important in 
any assessment of WTO disciplines applicable to SEZs because many SEZs host various 
service providers (telecommunications, banks, insurance companies and other financial 
services, brokers, freight forwarders and providers of other trade support, etc.). 
 
At the core of GATS are national treatment and MFN provisions. However, both national 
treatment and most favored nation treatment are highly qualified. National treatment is 
extended by GATS Article XVII only to service sectors listed in individual Member’s 
schedules of specific commitments and even these commitments may be conditioned and 
qualified. Members can list exemptions to MFN treatment in Article II in the Annex on 
Article II Exemptions. 
 
In those service sectors liberalized pursuant to a Member’s schedule, six measures are 
prohibited by Article XVI(2). These are, in summary: (1) limitations on the number of 
service suppliers; (2) limitations on the value of transactions or assets; (3) limitations on 
the total number of service operations or total quantity of service output; (4) limitations 
on the number of natural persons that can be employed in a particular service sector; (5) 
limitations on the type of legal entity that can be used; and (6) limitations on participation 
of foreign capital and investment.  
 
                                                 
72    G/L/837 (9 November 2007). 
73   GATS, Article 1. 
74   There are four modes of trade in services covered: cross-border trade (mode 1); consumption abroad 
(mode 2); commercial presence (mode 3); and presence of natural persons (mode 4). Ibid. 
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Government subsidies to service providers are not currently included as a measure 
subject to GATS discipline.
75 Article XV recognizes that subsidies may adversely affect 
trade in services and commits Members to negotiate in the future to develop disciplines 
regarding service subsidies. 
 
Depending on an individual Member’s schedules of specific commitments, GATS 
might be contravened if a government measure confers preferential treatment to 
local service providers (denial of national treatment) or confers preferential 
treatment to service providers from certain foreign countries (denial of MFN 
treatment). In addition, in service sectors liberalized under a particular Member’s 
schedule, the above-listed six measures in GATS Article XVI(2) are prohibited. 
 
4. A Matrix of WTO Disciplines  
 
The fiscal incentives offered by SEZs have become almost standardized internationally as 
a result of competitive pressures.
76 SEZ incentives include corporate tax reductions or 
exemptions for businesses that locate in SEZs; duty free and tax free importation of raw 
materials, intermediate inputs, capital goods and production equipment; no restrictions or 
taxes on capital and profits repatriation; exemption from foreign exchange controls when 
applicable; no duties or taxes assessed on exports; and exemption from most local and 
indirect taxes.
77 In addition, utilities may be provided at below-market rates and grants 
for education and training of workers may be provided.
78 However, “the reliance of zone 
programs on incentives …(such as income tax holidays) imposes significant costs on 
government budgets with little benefit….”
79 
 
Typical fiscal incentive and export promotion measures offered in connection with SEZ 
programs are analyzed below. For convenience, measures are divided into WTO 
consistent measures (“green light measures”), WTO prohibited measures (“red light 
measures”), and WTO questionable measures (“amber light measures”).
80   
 
75   The SCM Agreement, Annex I(h) covers the exemption, remission or deferral of prior-stage cumulative 
indirect taxes on services used in the production of export products in excess of the exemption, remission 
or deferral of taxes on services used in the production of goods for domestic consumption. This appears to 
be the only instance in which services are subject to a subsidies discipline. 
76   See Special Economic Zones: Performance, Lessons Learned, and Implications for Zone Development, 
supra,, pp. 48-49. 
77   Ibid. 
78   Michael Engman, Osamu Onodera and Enrico Pinali, Export Processing Zones: Past and Future Role in 
Trade and Development (OECD Trade Policy Working Paper No. 53, TD//TC/WP(2006)39/FINAL, p. 17. 
79   Special Economic Zones: Performance, Lessons Learned, and Implications for Zone Development, 
supra, p. 49. 
80   The descriptions of measures, explanations and recommended actions have been summarized for easy 
reference. In some cases, this may have unintentionally resulted in the omission of important details. The 
references to specific measures prohibited in Annex I is not meant to imply that Annex I is anything other 
than an illustrative list of export subsidies; measures not listed in Annex I may also constitute export 
subsidies if they fit the definition in SCMA Article 3.1(a). 
   
4.1 Typical SEZ measures that are WTO consistent (green light measures) 
Measure Explanation 
Measures imposed by non-governmental organizations, 
including incentives to businesses locating in SEZs. 
WTO disciplines do not apply to measures applied by private sector organizations, such as private 
SEZ operators, unless they are carrying out a governmental directive or the benefit is funded by 
government. 
Exemption of exported products from import duties.   The exemption of products exported to other countries from an SEZ from duties is not a “subsidy”. 
SCM Agreement, footnote 1. 
Exemption of exported products from indirect taxes.  The exemption of a product exported to other countries from an SEZ from indirect taxes is not a 
“subsidy”. SCM Agreement, footnote 1. (Indirect taxes are sales, excise, turnover, value added, 
franchise, stamp, transfer, inventory and equipment taxes, border taxes, and all taxes other than direct 
taxes and import charges. SCM Agreement, footnote 58.) 
Exemption of goods used in the production process from 
duties and indirect taxes when the end products are 
exported (as long as indirect tax exemption does not 
exceed that accorded to goods produced for domestic 
consumption). 
The exemption of production goods incorporated in end products that are subsequently exported to 
other countries from duties and indirect taxes is based on SCM Agreement, footnote 1 and Annex 1(h). 
Exemption of production waste from duties and indirect 
taxes when the waste is exported to other countries. 
The exemption of production waste from duties and taxes when exported is based on SCM Agreement, 
footnote 1 and Annex 1(h). (Exported production waste is a “product”.) Production waste entered into 
the customs territory is subject to duty and taxes, depending on its value. 
Exemption of goods stored in SEZs from duties and 
indirect taxes. 
Zones outside the “customs territory” of the country where they are physically located are recognized 
by multilateral agreement (WCO Revised Kyoto Convention, Specific Annex D, chapter 2) and 
customary international law. Duties and indirect taxes are normally not applied in these “free areas”. 
Non-specific subsidies, including generally applicable 
tax rates imposed by national, regional and local 
government authorities. 
Subsidies are non-specific if they are based on objective criteria or conditions and eligibility is 
automatic. Nation-wide programs are non-specific. National programs limited to designated regions or 
a limited number of enterprises are specific. However, generally applicable tax rates are non-specific, 
irrespective of the tax rates imposed in other regions or localities of a country. SCM Agreement, 
Article 2.2.  Example: An SEZ is an independent government taxing authority which imposes lower 
(or no) taxes compared with comparable regional or local governmental authorities in the same nation. 
This is not a “specific” subsidy. On the other hand, if a national government exempts a particular 
region from taxes, this is a “specific” subsidy. 
 4.2 Typical SEZ measures that are WTO illegal (red light measures) 
Measure Explanation  Remedy 
Direct subsidy contingent on export performance (e.g., cash 
payments are given by government based upon export 
performance). 
Prohibited by SCMA Article 3.1(a) and 
Annex I(a). Certain countries are exempt from 
this prohibition (see Tables 1 and 2).  
Remove cash payment or other direct 
subsidy or remove export performance 
requirement. 
Currency retention schemes involving a bonus on exports (e.g., SEZ 
exporters are allowed to retain foreign currency based on export 
performance). 
Prohibited by SCMA Article 3.1(a) and 
Annex I(b). Certain countries are exempt from 
this prohibition (see Tables 1 and 2). 
Remove bonus based on export 
performance. 
Internal transport and freight charges more favorable for export 
shipments than for domestic shipments (if mandated by 
government). 
Prohibited by SCMA Article 3.1(a) and 
Annex I(c). Certain countries are exempt from 
this prohibition (see Tables 1 and 2). 
Remove transport and freight preferences 
for export shipments. 
Provision by government of domestic products or services for use in 
production of exported goods on terms more favorable than for 
production of domestic goods (if the terms are more favorable than 
those commercially available on world markets) (e.g., a government 
provides electricity and other utilities for businesses in an SEZ at 
lower rates than for businesses outside the SEZ, and limits or 
prohibits imports from the SEZ for domestic consumption (i.e., 
consumption in the non-SEZ portion of the Member’s territory)  
and/or imposes export requirements). 
Prohibited by SCMA Article 3.1(a) and 
Annex I(d). Certain countries are exempt from 
this prohibition (see Tables 1 and 2). 
Remove discount for goods or services used 
for production of exported goods or remove 
limits on imports from the SEZ for domestic 
consumption and remove export 
requirements. 
Full or partial exemption, remission or deferral of direct taxes or 
social welfare charges imposed on businesses if contingent on 
exports (e.g., a government provides tax incentives to businesses in 
an SEZ and prohibits or limits imports from the SEZ for domestic 
consumption and/or imposes export requirements). 
Prohibited by SCMA Article 3.1(a) and 
Annex I(e). Certain countries are exempt from 
this prohibition (see Tables 1 and 2). 
Remove exemptions from direct taxes or 
social welfare charges or remove 
restrictions on imports from the SEZ for 
domestic consumption. Remove export 
requirements. 
Allowance of special direct tax deductions directly related to 
exports above those granted for domestic production (this applies 
Annex I(e) to tax deductions). 
Prohibited by SCMA Article 3.1(a) and 
Annex I(f). Certain countries are exempt from 
this prohibition (see Tables 1 and 2). 
Remove deductions for direct taxes or 
social welfare charges or remove 
restrictions on imports from the SEZ for 
domestic consumption; remove export 
performance requirements. 
Exemption or remission of indirect taxes on exports in excess of 
those levied on goods sold for domestic consumption (e.g., the VAT 
rate on a good sold for domestic consumption is 20%, while the 
exporter receives a VAT rebate of 25% when it exports the same 
product). 
Prohibited by SCMA Article 3.1(a) and 
Annex I(g). Certain countries are exempt from 
this prohibition (see Tables 1 and 2). 
Remove indirect tax exemption or remission 
preference for exports. 
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Exemption, remission or deferral of prior-stage cumulative indirect 
taxes on goods or services used in the production of exported 
products in excess of products sold for domestic consumption (e.g., 
exemption from sales tax on transport charges for an intermediate 
component used in an SEZ manufacturing process for a final 
product that is exported, where no such exemption is given on the 
transport of the same kind of component to a domestic 
manufacturer not located in the SEZ). Note: this provision is not 
applicable to products consumed in the production of exported 
products, consistent with Annex II. 
Prohibited by SCMA Article 3.1(a) and 
Annex I(h) and Annex II. Certain countries 
are exempt from this prohibition (see Tables 1 
and 2). 
Remove prior-stage cumulative indirect tax 
exemption preference for exports. 
Provision by governments of export credit guarantee or insurance 
programs at premium rates inadequate to cover long-term costs. 
Prohibited by SCMA Article 3.1(a) and 
Annex I(j). Certain countries are exempt from 
this prohibition (see Tables 1 and 2). 
Increase premium rates to a level adequate 
to cover long-term costs. 
Government grants of export credits at rates below those which they 
pay for the funds, or at below market rates, or payment of all or part 
of the costs in obtaining credits. However, export credit practices in 
conformity with certain international agreements are exempt. 
Prohibited by SCMA Article 3.1(a) and 
Annex I(k). Certain countries are exempt from 
this prohibition (see Tables 1 and 2). 
Change export credit rates to rates at which 
the government obtains the funds (market 
rates) or rates consistent with relevant 
international agreements. 
Legal provisions that allow output from the SEZs to be treated as 
“domestic production” based on local content or other criteria 
without application of national import duties and taxes when 
imported for domestic consumption. 
Prohibited by SCMA Article 3.1(b). All 
exemptions have expired except for those 
negotiated in accessions. See Article 27.3.  
Eliminate legal provisions that allow output 
from the SEZs to be treated as “domestic 
production” based on local content or other 
criteria and ensure that SEZ output sold in 
the non-SEZ portion of the WTO Member’s 
territory includes application of import 
duties and taxes. 
Subsidy contingent on the use of domestic over imported goods.  Prohibited by SCMA Article 3.1(b) except for 
those negotiated for accessions. All 
exemptions have expired. See Article 27.3. 
Remove requirement to use domestic goods. 
Certain countries are accorded preferential treatment by government 
directive. Example: Duty and sales tax exemptions on goods 
exported from SEZ are only granted if the goods are exported to 
certain Members. 
Prohibited by GATT Article I, unless 
preference is justified pursuant to a regional 
trade agreement (GATT Article 24). There are 
no exemptions for developing countries. 
Remove illegal preference. 
Domestic goods are given preference over foreign goods by 
government directive. Example: An SEZ is required by government 
to use domestic inputs when manufacturing goods for export. 
Prohibited by GATT Article III. SCM 
Agreement, Article 3.1(b) prohibits subsidies 
contingent upon the use of domestic over 
imported goods. There are no exemptions. 
Remove illegal preference or subsidy. 
  32Measure Explanation  Remedy 
Fees or taxes on imports or exports exceed the cost of services 
provided by government. Example: A customs processing fee 
imposed by government in connection with SEZ operations exceeds 
the cost of the services rendered. 
Prohibited by GATT Article VIII(1). Fees and 
charges must be limited to the approximate 
cost of services rendered. There are no 
exemptions for developing countries. 
Adjust fees and charges to correspond to the 
approximate cost of the services rendered. 
Import and export laws and regulations that are not published and 
made publicly available by Internet or otherwise. Example: An SEZ 
operates without published regulations and procedures. 
Prohibited by GATT Article X. There are no 
exemptions for developing countries. 
Publish all laws, regulations, directives and 
decisions relating to imports and exports. 
Quotas and/or export or import licenses are used to restrict trade. 
Example: A government imposes a quota on the importation of 
electronic consumer products and requires import licenses as a 
condition of importation. 
Prohibited by GATT Article XI unless subject 
to the three exceptions in Article XI and the 
exceptions in GATT XII (balance of 
payments), GATT XX (general exceptions) 
and GATT XXI (security exceptions), and the 
Agreement on Safeguards. Import licenses are 
subject to the provisions of the Agreement on 
Import Licenses. SDT treatment may be 
available in “exceptional circumstances” 
under GATT XXV and the Enabling Clause. 
Eliminate illegal quota. 
Government requires purchase or use of domestic products, whether 
specified in terms of volume, value of products or proportion of 
volume or value of local production.  
Prohibited by TRIMs Annex 1(a). Also 
prohibited by GATT Article III  
Eliminate requirement to purchase or use 
domestic products. 
Government limits enterprise’s purchases or use of imported 
products to an amount related to the volume or value of the local 
products that it exports. 
Prohibited by TRIMs Annex 1(b). Also 
prohibited by GATT Article III.  
Eliminate domestic purchase or use 
requirement. 
Government quantitative restrictions for which no exemption is 
applicable that restrict imports used in local production based upon 
the value of the local production that it exports. 
Prohibited by TRIMs Annex 2(a) and GATT 
Article XI. 
Eliminate quantitative restriction. 
Government restrictions of imports by restriction access to foreign 
exchange to an amount related to foreign exchange inflows 
attributable to the enterprise. 
Prohibited by TRIMs Annex 2(b) and GATT 
Article XI. 
Eliminate restrictions on access to foreign 
exchange based on foreign exchange 
inflows attributable to enterprise. 
Government restrictions on exports by an enterprise based upon the 
volume or value of its local production. 
Prohibited by TRIMs Annex 2(c) and GATT 
Article XI.  
Eliminate restrictions on exports based upon 
the volume or value of local production. 
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Measure  Explanation Proposed  Action 
Duty and tax free treatment of 
production equipment used in 
SEZs. 
Goods stored in SEZs are duty and tax free. In addition, products that are 
exported or are used or consumed in the production process in SEZs are 
duty and tax free. Some commentators argue that capital goods used in 
the production process in SEZs are not covered by these exemptions. See 
Raul Torres, Free Zones and the World Trade Organization Agreement 
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Global Trade and Customs 
Journal, vol. 2, issue 5 (2007), p. 221. Mr. Torres’ view appears to reflect 
the views of the WTO SCM Committee staff. The counterarguments are 
that (1) all goods stored in SEZs are duty and tax free; (2) duty and tax 
exemptions for production equipment are not specifically listed as a 
prohibited subsidy in SCMA Annex I; and (3) at the end of its useful life 
in the SEZ production equipment will either be exported duty and tax 
free; entered into domestic commerce upon payment of applicable duties 
and taxes; or discarded as scrap. Duty and tax exemptions for production 
equipment are employed by many SEZ programs around the world.  
The contractual arrangements regarding production 
equipment used in an SEZ may determine whether 
exemptions from duties and taxes for production 
equipment constitute a prohibited subsidy. For 
example, imported production equipment that is 
leased and that by contract will be exported at the 
end of the lease may be deemed a “product” exempt 
from duties and taxes pursuant to SCMA footnote 1.  
Production equipment that is purchased and installed 
as a permanent fixture in an SEZ may not be exempt 
because it is deemed to be capital equipment, not a 
“product”.  There is no clear precedent regarding this 
issue and SEZ programs that exempt production 
equipment from duties and taxes should be aware of 
the risk that the measure could be determined to be 
an export subsidy. 
Government subsidies for 
infrastructure development in 
an SEZ (e.g., a government 
pays for roads, sewage systems, 
buildings, harbors, airports, 
electrical grids, water systems, 
etc.).  
Government provision of "general infrastructure" falls outside the scope 
of the SCM Agreement (SCMA Article 1.1(a)(1)(iii). However, 
Government assistance to a designated geographic region is considered to 
be a specific subsidy. SCMA Article 2.2.  As a specific subsidy, it is 
“actionable” pursuant to SCMA Articles 5-7 or the provisions on 
countervailing measures. However, it is not a prohibited subsidy unless it 
is contingent on export performance or the use of domestic over imported 
goods. Article 3.1.  A requirement that the SEZ export all or most of its 
production or a limitation on sales to the domestic market may turn 
government subsidies for SEZ development into a prohibited subsidy. 
Infrastructure development subsidies should not be 
linked to requirements that an SEZ export all or most 
of its production. Infrastructure development 
subsidies that are specific to SEZs may be 
“actionable” but SDT provisions regarding 
countervailing measures make it unlikely that most 
countries will be subject to unilateral countervailing 
action resulting from infrastructure development 
subsidies. 
Members whose export 
subsidies are exempted 
pursuant to SCMA Article 
27.2(b) reach “export 
competitiveness” for a product 
pursuant to Article 27.5. 
Certain countries are eligible for exemption from the prohibition on 
export subsidies through 2015. See Table 2. However, if they reach 
“export competitiveness” for a product (a share of at least 3.25% of 
world trade for two consecutive years) they must phase out export 
subsidies for that product within two years.  
“Export competitiveness” for products should be 
monitored on the basis of Harmonized Tariff 
Schedules Nomenclature. Export subsidies for 
products that reach “export competitiveness should 
be eliminated within two years. 
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Measure  Explanation Proposed  Action 
Members whose export 
subsidies are exempted 
pursuant to SCMA 27.2(a) and 
Annex VII(b) reach “export 
competitiveness” for a product 
pursuant to Article 27.5. 
Certain low middle-income countries are exempted from the prohibition 
on export subsidies until per capita GNP exceeds $1,000 in 1990 dollars 
for three consecutive years.  
“Export competitiveness” for products should be 
monitored on the basis of Harmonized Tariff  
Nomenclature item numbers. Export subsidies for 
products that reach “export competitiveness should 
be eliminated within 8 years.  
All countries’ export subsidies 
benefiting from SDT treatment 
(SCMA Article 27). 
Export subsidies that are exempt from the prohibition on export subsidies 
pursuant to SCMA Article 27 are nonetheless specific subsidies and as 
such they are actionable pursuant to SCMA Article 27.7 and may also be 
countervailable. The United States Government has taken the position 
that export subsidies exempt pursuant to Article 27 are actionable.   
SDT provisions regarding unilateral countervailing 
measures make it unlikely that most countries will be 
subject to countervailing action resulting from 
exempted export subsidies. 
Government subsidies to SEZ 
businesses that export most of 
their production, with no de 
jure government requirement to 
export. 
Article 3.1(a) and footnote 4 to the SCMA provide that an export subsidy 
exists “when the facts demonstrate that the granting of a subsidy, without 
having been made legally contingent upon export performance, is in fact 
tied to” exports. In Australia-Automotive Leather II (DS126) (1999), the 
recipient was required to meet sales goals that exceeded the domestic 
market and 90% of the product was exported. The Panel found that 
payments under a grant contract were prohibited subsidies because 
payments were in fact tied to export performance.  
A broad range of enterprises, including those making 
products primarily for the domestic market, should 
be encouraged to locate in SEZs. Every effort should 
be made to encourage the domestic consumption of 
products produced in SEZs.  5. Achieving WTO Compliance 
 
There are four principal elements in a program to achieve WTO compliance regarding 
government measures employed in connection with SEZ programs. These are (1) a 
thorough review of all applicable measures and identification of possible inconsistent 
measures; (2) prompt reporting of possible WTO inconsistent measures; (3) development 
of a plan to phase-out WTO inconsistent measures; and (4) implementation of the phase-
out plan. These are summarized below. 
 
Review and Identification. All Members, and in particular middle income countries, 
should review their SEZ programs in detail to assure compliance with the SCM 
Agreement and other WTO disciplines. This is best accomplished using independent 
advisors and not government officials or local experts that may have a vested interest in 
defending the existing measures. It may be appropriate to request technical assistance 
from experts at the WTO, international financial institutions and other donors in 
connection with such a review. Upon request, the WTO Secretariat staff routinely provide 
confidential advice and in-depth technical assistance to individual Members about their 
programs, including bringing these into conformity with WTO disciplines. 
 
SEZ programs in middle income countries are examined by the WTO as part of regularly 
scheduled trade policy reviews (TPRs). MICs are normally reviewed every 6 years. 
Preparation by MICs for scheduled TPRs should include a thorough review of all 
measures relating to SEZs. 
 
Members that maintain export subsidies pursuant to SCM Agreement Article 27.2 (b) and 
Annex VII(b) (the per capita GNP under $1,000 in 1990 dollars provision) should 
annually determine (a) whether per capita GNP has exceeded the limit for 3 consecutive 
years
81 , and (b) whether specific products have reached “export competitiveness” 
pursuant to SCMA Articles 27.5 and 27.6.
82 Members that maintain export subsidies 
pursuant to Article 27.4 and relevant extensions should also monitor whether specific 
products have reached “export competitiveness” and comply with all reporting and 
notification requirements. 
 
Notification. Changes with regards to export subsidy exemptions and other measures that 
are specific subsidies should be notified to the WTO Committee on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures by 30 June of each year.
83 The notifications must contain 
sufficient detail to enable an understanding of the operation of the subsidy programs and 
                                                 
81   See the calculations produced and circulated by the WTO Secretariat in the G/SCM/110/… series, 
82   As discussed before, there is uncertainty over the breadth of the definition of a "product"  If the correct 
interpretation is that this is a 4-digit HS tariff heading, it is clearly far more likely that a given product will 
reach export competitiveness than if the correct interpretation is that this is an entire section of the HS.  
Members should monitor this assessment on both bases.  In addition, the WTO Secretariat can be requested, 
pursuant to Article 27.6, to calculate whether a given developing Member has reached export 
competitiveness in a product.  To date, such calculations have been requested and performed for Colombia, 
Thailand and India  See G/SCM/46, G/SCM/48, and G/SCM/103.    
83   SCMA Article 25.1. 
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84 Progress made in the removal of export 
subsidies and other subsidy measures should also be notified to the Committee. Countries 
entitled to a phase-out period for export subsidies pursuant to Article 27.4 and WTO 
decisions must also meet annual notification requirements regarding these subsidies. 
 
Other WTO inconsistent measures should be notified to appropriate WTO bodies. See, 
e.g., GATS, Article III.3. WTO trade policy reviews assess whether reviewed Members 
have complied with notification requirements. 
 
Compliance plan. The next step is the development of a compliance plan to change 
prohibited subsidies and other WTO prohibited measures into WTO non-prohibited 
measures or to remove the measure. In this connection, it is important to consult with 
SEZ businesses and investors. In some instances, SEZ incentive measures cannot be 
modified or repealed without the consent of existing businesses and investors that have 
made financial commitments in reliance on these incentives. For example, after SEZ 
incentive measures were repealed in Ukraine in 2005, subsequent court decisions 
continued the fiscal measures for certain investors.
85  
 
In many instances, prohibited export subsidies can be converted into actionable subsidies 
by removing any de jure or de facto obligation to export goods produced in an SEZ and 
allowing zone enterprises full access to the domestic market on a duty and tax paid basis. 
In addition, specific but allowed subsidies can be converted into non-specific subsidies 
by, for example, extending benefits such as tax reductions to all businesses irrespective of 
location or sector. This would move them outside the scope of the SCMA’s provisions. 
 
Implementation. Members that do not have the benefit of SDT treatment for export 
subsidies should remove illegal export subsidies and other measures that are WTO 
inconsistent as soon as possible.   
 
Currently, pursuant to SDT treatment, 18 countries can maintain export subsidies because 
their per capita GNP is under US$1,000 in 1990 dollars (see Table 1) and 16 MICs can 
maintain “grandfathered” export subsidies through 2015 (see Table 2).  Both categories 
of exempt countries should plan to phase-out all export subsidies by 2015 at the latest 
since it is well possible that the countries in the first category will “graduate” by then (i.e., 
per capita GNP will exceed $1,000 in 1990 dollars for three consecutive years) and that 
further extensions will not be granted for “grandfathered” programs.  In view of the 
likelihood that the legal rights of SEZ investors may prevent the termination of fiscal 
incentives without compensation, the phase-out of export subsidies should begin as soon 
as possible and not be deferred until near the end of the extension period. 
 
Countries whose products are “graduated” pursuant to the provisions of SCMA Articles 
27.5 and 27.6 should develop export subsidy elimination plans for those products so that 
the subsidy can be eliminated within the time periods required by the Agreement (8 years 
for an Annex VII Member, 2 years for other Members). 
                                                 
84   Ibid, Article 25.3. 
85 Sergei Salivon, “They Will be There Forever,” Tax News,  BIZNES (October 1, 2007). 
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  39Annex:  Illustrative List of Export Subsidies (SCMA, Annex I) 
 
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Annex I 
 
ILLUSTRATIVE LIST OF EXPORT SUBSIDIES 
 
(a)  The provision by governments of direct subsidies to a firm or an industry 
contingent upon export performance. 
 
(b)  Currency retention schemes or any similar practices which involve a bonus on 
exports. 
 
(c)  Internal transport and freight charges on export shipments, provided or mandated 
by governments, on terms more favourable than for domestic shipments. 
 
(d)  The provision by governments or their agencies either directly or indirectly 
through government-mandated schemes, of imported or domestic products or 
services for use in the production of exported goods, on terms or conditions more 
favourable than for provision of like or directly  competitive products or services 
for use in the production of goods for domestic consumption, if (in the case of 
products) such terms or conditions are more favourable than those commercially 
available
86 on world markets to their exporters. 
 
(e)  The full or partial exemption remission, or deferral specifically related to exports, 
of direct taxes
87 or social welfare charges paid or payable by industrial or 
commercial enterprises.
88 
                                                 
86 The term "commercially available" means that the choice between domestic and imported products is 
unrestricted and depends only on commercial considerations. 
87 For the purpose of this Agreement: 
  The term "direct taxes" shall mean taxes on wages, profits, interests, rents, royalties, and all other 
forms of income, and taxes on the ownership of real property; 
  The term "import charges" shall mean tariffs, duties, and other fiscal charges not elsewhere 
enumerated in this note that are levied on imports; 
  The term "indirect taxes" shall mean sales, excise, turnover, value added, franchise, stamp, 
transfer, inventory and equipment taxes, border taxes and all taxes other than direct taxes and import 
charges; 
  "Prior-stage" indirect taxes are those levied on goods or services used directly or indirectly in 
making the product; 
  "Cumulative" indirect taxes are multi-staged taxes levied where there is no mechanism for 
subsequent crediting of the tax if the goods or services subject to tax at one stage of production are used in 
a succeeding stage of production; 
  "Remission" of taxes includes the refund or rebate of taxes; 
  "Remission or drawback" includes the full or partial exemption or deferral of import charges. 
88  The Members recognize that deferral need not amount to an export subsidy where, for example, 
appropriate interest charges are collected. The Members reaffirm the principle that prices for goods in 
transactions between exporting enterprises and foreign buyers under their or under the same control should 
for tax purposes be the prices which would be charged between independent enterprises acting at arm's 
length. Any Member may draw the attention of another Member to administrative or other practices which 
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(f)  The allowance of special deductions directly related to exports or export 
performance, over and above those granted in respect to production for domestic 
consumption, in the calculation of the base on which direct taxes are charged. 
 
(g)  The exemption or remission, in respect of the production and distribution of 
exported products, of indirect taxes in excess of those levied in respect of the 
production and distribution of like products when sold for domestic consumption. 
 
(h)  The exemption, remission or deferral of prior-stage cumulative indirect taxes on 
goods or services used in the production of exported products in excess of the 
exemption, remission or deferral of like prior-stage cumulative indirect taxes on 
goods or services used in the  production of like products when sold for domestic 
consumption;  provided, however, that prior-stage cumulative indirect taxes may 
be exempted, remitted or deferred on exported products even when not exempted, 
remitted or deferred on like products when sold for domestic consumption, if the 
prior-stage cumulative indirect taxes are levied on inputs that are consumed in the 
production of the exported product  (making normal allowance for waste).
89  This 
item shall be interpreted in accordance with the guidelines on consumption of 
inputs in the production process contained in Annex II. 
 
(i)  The remission or drawback of import charges58 in excess of those levied on 
imported inputs that are consumed in the production of the exported product 
(making normal allowance for waste);  provided, however, that in particular cases 
a firm may use a quantity of home market  inputs equal to, and having the same 
quality and characteristics as, the imported inputs as a substitute for them in order 
to benefit from this provision if the import and the corresponding export 
operations both occur within a reasonable time period, not to exceed two years.   
This item shall be interpreted in accordance with the guidelines on consumption 
of inputs in the production process contained in Annex II and the guidelines in the 
determination of substitution drawback systems as export subsidies contained in 
Annex III. 
 
(j)  The provision by governments (or special institutions controlled by governments) 
of export credit guarantee or insurance programmes, of insurance or guarantee 
programmes against increases in the cost of exported products or of exchange risk 
programmes, at premium rates which are inadequate to cover the long-term 
operating costs and losses of the programmes. 
                                                                                                                                                 
may contravene this principle and which result in a significant saving of direct taxes in export transactions. 
In such circumstances the Members shall normally attempt to resolve their differences using the facilities of 
existing bilateral tax treaties or other specific international mechanisms, without prejudice to the rights and 
obligations of Members under GATT 1994, including the right of consultation created in the preceding 
sentence. 
  Paragraph (e) is not intended to limit a Member from taking measures to avoid the double taxation 
of foreign-source income earned by its enterprises or the enterprises of another Member. 
89 Paragraph (h) does not apply to value-added tax systems and border-tax adjustment in lieu thereof;  the 
problem of the excessive remission of value-added taxes is exclusively covered by paragraph (g). 
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(k)  The grant by governments (or special institutions controlled by and/or acting 
under the authority of governments) of export credits at rates below those which 
they actually have to pay for the funds so employed (or would have to pay if they 
borrowed on international capital markets in order to obtain funds of the same 
maturity and other credit terms and denominated in the same currency as the 
export credit), or the payment by them of all or part of the costs incurred by 
exporters or financial institutions in obtaining credits, in so far as they are used to 
secure a material advantage in the field of export credit terms. 
 
Provided, however, that if a Member is a party to an international undertaking on 
official export credits to which at least twelve original Members to this 
Agreement are parties as of 1 January 1979 (or a successor undertaking which has 
been adopted by those original Members), or if in practice a Member applies the 
interest rates provisions of the relevant undertaking, an export credit practice 
which is in conformity with those provisions shall not be considered an export 
subsidy prohibited by this Agreement. 
 
(l)  Any other charge on the public account constituting an export subsidy in the sense 
of Article XVI of GATT 1994. 
 
__________ 